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FACTS
Appellees, for nearly all "facts" specified in their Response Brief, fail to cite to the
record. Under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, "[a]ll statements of fact . . . shall
be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule."
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). Rule 24(k) allows this Court to disregard or strike, on motion
or sua sponte, all unsupported factual assertions.
Also, rather than controvert Appellant's citations to the record, appellees, in a
wholly unsupported and conclusory manner, merely and repeatedly state that Appellant
Ferguson "failed to offer any evidence" (Appellees' Br. at 3), or "FAILED TO
PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE" (id at 4) or he "pointed to no evidence at trial" (id at 9)
or the "total absence of any evidence presented at trial" (id. at 10) or to "no evidence
presented below" (id.) or he "offered no evidence at trial" (id. at 11) or of "no evidence"
(id. at 12) or "Ferguson doesn't identify any evidence offered at trial" (id. at 14) or "the
evidence offered at trial did not support such a claim" (id.) or he "failed to present any
evidence of damage" (id. at 15), and rest on the result below by only asserting
"Ferguson's failure to present any evidence in support of his claim." (Id.).
Ferguson cited to the summary judgment proceedings, including specific
deposition testimony

and exhibits, and to the trial transcript to show that

defendants/appellees acted with malice and thus abused any conditional privilege that
may have existed. In this record evidence, Ferguson illustrated the self-contradictory
testimony from defendants/appellees and the unsupportable statements made when
compared to the facts of the situation. The jury should have been allowed to determine
l

this matter based on the direct evidence from Arthur Glenn and Gary Ferguson and the
circumstantial evidence from the context and circumstances surrounding the situation;
and, thus, the directed verdict was error. The Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second
Edition, provide details of the jury's role in this regard:
CV120 Direct and circumstantial evidence.
A fact may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence consists of facts or circumstances that allow
someone to reasonably infer the truth of the facts to be proved. For
example, if the fact to be proved is whether Johnny ate the cherry pie, and a
witness testifies that she saw Johnny take a bite of the cherry pie, that is
direct evidence of the fact. If the witness testifies that she saw Johnny with
cherries smeared on his face and an empty pie plate in his hand, that is
circumstantial evidence of the fact.
CV121 Believability of witnesses.
Testimony in this case will be given under oath. You must evaluate the
believability of that testimony. You may believe all or any part of the
testimony of a witness. You may also believe one witness against many
witnesses or many against one, in accordance with your honest convictions.
In evaluating the testimony of a witness, you may want to consider the
following:
(1) Personal interest. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was
affected one way or the other by any personal interest the witness has in the
case?
(2) Bias. Do you believe the accuracy of the testimony was affected by
any bias or prejudice?
(3) Demeanor. Is there anything about the witness's appearance,
conduct or actions that causes you to give more or less weight to the
testimony?
(4) Consistency. How does the testimony tend to support or not support
other believable evidence that is offered in the case?
(5) Knowledge. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know what
[he] is testifying about?
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(6) Memory. Does the witness's memory appear to be reliable?
(7) Reasonableness. Is the testimony of the witness reasonable in light
of human experience?
These considerations are not intended to limit how you evaluate
testimony. You are the ultimate judges of how to evaluate believability.
CV122 Inconsistent statements.
You may believe that a witness, on another occasion, made a statement
inconsistent with that witness's testimony given here. That doesn't mean
that you are required to disregard the testimony. It is for you to decide
whether to believe the witness.
CV123 Effect of willfully false testimony.
If you believe any witness has intentionally testified falsely about any
important matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness, or
you may disregard only the intentionally false testimony.
Ferguson presented competent evidence showing that Williams made both
inconsistent statements and willfully false testimony; indeed, he could not even point to
any specific instance of Ferguson over-billing! (R. at 185, Ex. E at 98-101; 864-158).
Williams stated the law firm was "unable to determine which specific entries - typically
were unable to determine which specific entries reflected bills for work he [Ferguson] did
not do." (R. at 864-224 to -225). No one in the firm reported this over-billing to the
Utah State Bar, which all who "knew" this to be "true" were ethically bound to do. (R.
at 864-259 to -261). Ferguson thus showed inconsistent and willfully false testimony that
should have reached the jury.
The directed verdict was improper in this case because "[i]f there is a reasonable
basis in the evidence that would support a verdict in favor of the losing party, the directed
verdict cannot stand." Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991) (citing
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Management Comm. of Gray stone Pines Homeowners Ass 'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc.,
652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982)). And, "whether the holder of the [conditional] privilege
lost it due to abuse presents a question of fact." O'Connor v. Burningham, 2007 UT 58, *[f
38, 165 P.3d 1214, 1224 (citing Wayment v. Clear Channel Broad, Inc., 2005 UT 25, ^
53, 116 P.3d 271; Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58; Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 119
Utah 407, 228 P.2d 272, 274-75 (1951)). A federal district court sitting in diversity, and
thus, applying Utah law, succinctly explained why: "Whether Defendants acted with
malice is a determination for a jury to make after hearing the evidence and assessing the
credibility of those who testify. For this court to make such a finding would invade the
province of the jury and constitute reversible error." Murphree v. US Bank of Utah, N.A.,
282 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1298-99 (D. Utah 2003).

The jury should have had the

opportunity to weigh the inconsistent statements heard at trial and accept or reject what
could have constituted willfully false testimony from defendant Williams, and the bald
unsupported assertions in appellees' response mirror the reasoning in directing a verdict
in the first place.

4

ARGUMENT
ISSUE I
Defendants/appellees hope to avoid this Court's long-standing and still binding
conditional privilege precedent by "correcting" this Court in arguing that old precedent,
namely Hales v. Commercial Bank, 197 P.2d 910 (Utah 1948), no longer applies due to
United States Supreme Court defamation law developments.

Appellees also cite to

several non-Utah cases, which do not prove instructive in the present case because clearly
applicable precedent from this Court exists and governs. See O'Connor, 2007 UT 58,
165 P.3d 1214; Wayment v. Clear Channel Borad, Inc., 2005 UT 25, 116 P.3d 272.
Whatever appellees' protestations, Utah cases faithfully follow the United States
Supreme Court's teachings in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1972). Hales remains good law and this
Court's recent defamation cases control this action and dictate reversal of the trial court's
directed verdict.
The Utah common law reasonable belief standard (and as discussed below, it
comports with the actual malice concept defendants/appellees argue for) fits within
permissible "knowledge" or "reckless disregard" post Gertz and post Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 601 merger into section 600.

Truly, the reasonable belief

standard and the common law malice standard are not mutually exclusive. The Combes
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272, 275 (Utah 1951) case, which cited to the
Hales case, stated in addition to the required factors for a conditional privilege to apply,
"[tjhere must also be an honest belief in the truth of the statement. When these facts are
5

found to exist, the communication is protected by the law, unless the plaintiff can show
malice on the defendant's part; the burden in this respect being on the plaintiff."

The

Combes court embraced the same heightened requirement to defeat the conditional
privilege as the post Gertz cases and Restatement counsel:
It should be borne in mind that there is a distinction between the malice
which is implied from every defamatory publication and the actual malice
which is necessary to remove a conditional provilege [sic], the privileged
communication being an exception to the rule that every such defamatory
publication implies malice; National Standard Life Ins. Co v. Billington,
Tex.Civ.App., 89 S.W.2d 491 at page 493, states a definition of this type of
malice which has been used and approved by numerous courts: 'This kind
of malice * * * which overcomes and destroys the privilege, is, of course,
quite distinct from that which the law, in the first instance, imputes with
respect to every defamatory charge, irrespective of motive. It has been
defined to be an indirect and wicked motive which induces the defendant
to defame the plaintiff."
Where the conditional privilege exists, the defendant is protected unless
plaintiff pleads and proves facts which indicate actual malice in that the
utterances were made from spite, ill will or hatred toward him and, unless
the plaintiff produces such evidence, there is no issue to be submitted to the
jury, Speilberg v Kuhn & Brother Co. et aL, 39 Utah 276, 116 P. 1027;
Williams v. Standard Examiner Pub. Co., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1. The law
concerning this principle is well stated by the court in the case of Wagner v.
Scott, 164 Mo. 289, 63 S.W. 1107, where the court, quoting from Newell,
Slander and Libel, says at page 1111: 'The jury, however, will be the
proper tribunal to determine the question of express malice where evidence
of ill will is forthcoming; but if, taken in connection with admitted facts,
the words complained of are such as must have been used honestly and in
good faith by the defendant, the judge may withdraw the case from a jury,
and direct a verdict for the defendant.'
228 P.2d at 276-77 (emphasis added). Ferguson meets this long-standing Utah common
law malice requirement to defeat any possible conditional privilege defendants/appellees
may invoke due to defendant Williams* admissions on cross-examination. (R. at 864-224
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to -226). Utah law is in complete harmony with United States Supreme Court precedent
and Restatement principles.
This Court's precedent controls the outcome of this case. The Restatement may
inform this Court and other Utah courts, but the Restatement need not control the issues
present here because:
The American Law Institute's restatements are drafted by legal scholars
who attempt to summarize the state of the law in a given area, predict how
the law is changing, and suggest the direction the law should take. The
restatement serves an appropriate advisory role to courts in approaching
unsettled areas of law. We emphasize, however, that section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, as drafted in 1965, is not binding on our
decision in this case except insofar as we explicitly adopt its various
doctrinal principles.
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991). Nonetheless, the concepts found
in section 600 harmonize with both past and current Utah precedent, the trial court
merely misapprehended both sources of authority when it instead applied inapposite
Alaska law to this case, DeNardo v. Bax, 147 P.3d 672 (Alaska 2006) and Mount Juneau
Enterprises, Inc. v. Juneau Empire, 891 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1995), in granting the directed
verdict, which constitutes reversible error.
Defendants/appellees destroyed Ferguson's reputation. u 'At its core, an action for
defamation is intended to protect an individual's interest in maintaining a good
reputation.'" West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994). In Utah,
"a statement is defamatory if it impeaches an individual's honesty, integrity, virtue, or
reputation and thereby exposes the individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule."
West, 872 P.2d at 1008 (citing Cox, 761 P.2d at 561 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-
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2(1))). This Court recognizes that "the integrity of an individual's reputation is essential
to his standing in society, in his vocation, and even in his family." Seegmiller v. KSL,
Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 973 (Utah 1981). Defendants/appellees defamed Ferguson, damaging
his good reputation in the medical malpractice defense field in the process, with actual
malice, and therefore abused any conditional privilege that would have otherwise applied.
Several federal court decisions have analyzed and followed this Court's consistent
conditional privilege decisions. Recently, in MacArthur, the district court explained:
As detailed most recently in the Wayment opinion, the question of
"requisite degree of fault" that must be shown largely turns upon whether
the plaintiff is in some sense a "public figure." 2005 UT 25, fflf 17-36, 116
P.3d 271, 279-84. If a plaintiff is a non-"public" private individual, "the
necessary degree of fault which must be shown in a defamation action ... is
negligence." Seegmiller, 626 P.2d at 973; accord, In re I.M.L. v. State of
Utah, 2002 UT 110, \ 25, 61 P.3d 1038, 1045 ("in a civil action for libel
'actual malice' is required if the statement concerns a public official,
whereas only negligence is required if the statement concerns a private
citizen"); see 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 21 (1995).
MacArthur v. San Juan County, 416 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1184 (D. Utah 2005).

In

Murphree, the court noted "Utah courts have defined common law malice as "ill will or
spite." 282 F. Supp. 2d at 1297 (citing Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 560 n.3 (Utah
1988)). The court elaborated: "In addition, in Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842
P.2d 896, 904-05 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that common law
malice is demonstrated by statements that 'were made with ill will, were excessively
published, or the defendant did not reasonably believe his or her statements were true.'"
Id (quoting Russell, 842 P.2d at 905).

"To be demonstrably 'true' or 'false,' the

published statements must be statements of fact, not mere opinion or belief."
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B.J.

Barnes & Sons Trucking, Inc. v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., No. Civ. 2:05-CV351BSJ, 2006 WL 1472689, at *3 (D. Utah May, 22, 2006) (emphasis in original).
The Russell court stated:

"Under the common law standard of malice, to

overcome a conditional privilege, a plaintiff must show an improper motive such as a
desire to do harm or that the defendant did not honestly believe his statements to be true
or that the publication was excessive." 842 P.2d at 904. Determining the honesty of a
witness is entirely the jury's province. And, under the Brehany standard of review, the
question whether defamation is conditionally privileged remains a question of law unless
a genuine factual issue exists whether scope of privilege exceeded or defendant acted
with actual malice. Ferguson raised numerous genuine factual issues of actual malice at
trial

as

shown

in his

statement

of

facts

presented

to

this

Court,

which

defendants/appellees remain unable to refute or controvert (except by unsupported,
conclusory "no evidence" statements).
Defendants/appellees incorrectly rely on Restatement (Second) of Torts section
603 in an attempt to defend their position. However, section 603, comment a begins with
the following quote, omitted from the Brief of Appellees:
Any conditional privilege is created because the interest of the publisher,
the recipient of the defamatory publication or some third person or an
interest of the public is actually or apparently involved, and the knowledge
by the recipient of the defamatory matter, if it is true, is likely to be of
service in the protection of that interest. If the defamatory matter is not in
any part published for its protection, the privilege is abused.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 603, comment a (1977) (emphasis added). As Ferguson
testified and showed in the record, over-billing was simply not true. Arthur Glenn, the
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alleged over-billing victim, did not find anything unusual in Ferguson's billing, even after
investigation. (R. at 185, Ex. B at 22). When asked to demonstrate an honest belief,
defendants/appellees did not show Arthur Glenn any proof of over-billing. (R. at 185,
Ex. B at 25; 864-299 to -300, -304).

The defamatory over-billing simply was not true.

Any possible conditional privilege was abused and lost due to the untruths surrounding
appellees' calculated method to not only fire Ferguson, but to destroy his reputation with
his main client and then take Ferguson's case. The trial court should not have directed
the verdict.
ISSUE II
Appellant wishes to correct an error made in the Brief of Appellant previously
filed with this Court. As appellees point out, Issue II should not relate to summary
judgment as to intentional interference with prospective business relations as to Siegfried
and Jensen as incorrectly noted in the Statement of Issues and Summary of the
Arguments sections of the Brief of Appellant, but rather should relate to intentional
interference with prospective business relations as to UMIA, as specified in the
Argument section of that brief. Appellants determined not to present the Siegfried and
Jensen issue to this Court, but failed to properly edit the earlier portions of the brief to
reflect that decision. However, Appellants did wish to present the intentional interference
with prospective business relations as to UMIA to this Court, although this issue arises
not from summary judgment, where Judge Medley correctly denied summary judgment,
but rather as an effect of the incorrect directed verdict based on the conditional privilege
issue.
10

Ferguson described the contextual facts and circumstances surrounding the
defamation published to UMIA, the client for whom Ferguson did 100% work for in
2005, by defendants/appellees. (R. at 863-69). These facts and circumstances illustrate
his intentional interference with prospective economic relations with UMIA claim, which
forms a substantial part of Ferguson's damages. "The tort of intentional interference with
prospective economic relations reaches beyond protection of an interest in an existing
contract and protects a party's interest in prospective relationships of economic
advantage not yet reduced to a formal contract (and perhaps not expected to be)." Leigh
Furniture and Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293 302 (Utah 1982) (citing Buckaloo v.
Johnson, 14 Cal.3d 815, 537 P.2d 865, 868-69, 122 Cal.Rptr. 745, 748-49 (1975);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B comment c; Prosser, Handbook of the Law of
Torts § 130 (4th ed. 1971)). In the Leigh case, this Court recognized "a common-law
cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic relations," and
adopted the Oregon definition of this tort. Id. at 304 (citing Straube v. Larson, 287 Or.
357, 361, 600 P.2d 371, 374 (1979); Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283
Or. 201,205, 209, 582 P.2d 1365, 1368, 1371 (1978)). "Under this definition, in order to
recover damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered
with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose
or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Id.
The United States District Court for the District of Utah recently reviewed these
principles:

n

The "economic relations" protected by this theory are diverse. "Driving
away an individual's existing or potential customers is the archetypical
injury this cause of action was devised to remedy. E.g., Guillory v. Godfrey,
134 Cal.App.2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955); Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145,
119 N.W. 946 (1909); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 130
(4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B(a)," Leigh, 657 P.2d
at 306, but protection extends to "any prospective contractual relations ... if
the potential contract would be of pecuniary value to the plaintiff
(excluding contracts to marry), as well as "a continuing business or other
customary relationship not amounting to a formal contract." Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 766B comment c (1979).
The question of interference for an "improper purpose" or by an "improper
means" requires the weighing of several relevant factors:
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with
a contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or
not, consideration is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and
the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference
and
(g) the relations between the parties.
MacArthur, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 1182-83 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767(a)(g) (1979)). "The alternative of improper purpose will be satisfied where it can be shown
that the actor's predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff...." Id. (citing 657 P.2d at
307) (footnote & citations omitted). If the actor's conduct is directed solely to the
satisfaction of his spite or ill will and not at all to the advancement of his competitive
interests over the person harmed, his interference is held to be improper. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 768 comment g. When giving consideration to the factors listed
directly above, (a) through (g), and recalling the facts Ferguson cites from the record in
this case, improper purpose by defendants/appellees in defaming Ferguson and
interfering with his prospective business relations becomes readily apparent, and this
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issue flows directly from the underlying defamation in this case, for which the trial court
should not have directed the verdict.
ISSUES HI & IV
The trial court should not have granted summary judgment to defendant
Frankenburg because he was a central player in the central issue in this case, the
defamation of Ferguson to UMIA, and the retention of all of Ferguson's UMIA legal
business, by defendants/appellees. The trial court should not have granted defendants'
motions in limine because the issues went to the heart of Ferguson's malice burden of
proof and were directly relevant thereto. The totality of circumstances reviewed in
context of the facts supported in the record in this case support a finding of actual malice
that shows an abuse by defendants/appellees of any possibly applicable conditional
privilege to the defamatory per se statements about Ferguson. The trial court should not
have directed the verdict against Ferguson.
CONCLUSION
The trial court, through summary judgment, motion in limine ruling, and directed
verdict upon close of Plaintiff s evidence disregarded the genuine issues of material fact
and the reasonable bases in the evidence that would support a verdict.

For all the

foregoing reasons, Ferguson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's
summary judgment order as to defendant Frankenburg, the trial court's motion in limine
ruling, and the trial court's directed verdict and remand this case for trial.
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DATED this 10th day of September 2008.

THE SPENCE LAW FIRM, LLC

Mel C. Orchard, III
Attorney for Appellant
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